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1 Joseph Beale, “Jurisdiction to Tax” (1919) Vol. 32 (6), Harvard Law Review, 587.
2 Total revenue losses suffered by the 15 members of the Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS) as result of tax incentives has been put at
US$9.6 million. For Ghana, the average revenue losses from corporate tax
incentives for 2011-14 has been put at US$693 million. See ActionAid, “The
West African Giveaway: Use and Abuse of Corporate Tax Incentives in
ECOWAS” (July 2015), 4.
3 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2015 put the value of discretional tax
treatment in Ghana at three times the allocation for health. Ibid 13. According to
ActionAid, the value of the tax incentive in Kenya for 2010/11 of about KShs
100 billion is almost twice the government’s entire health budget of KShs 41.5
billion. See ActionAid, “Tax Competition in East Africa: A Race to the Bottom?
Tax Incentives and Revenue Losses in Kenya” (May 2012), 9 <www.taxjustice.net/
cms/upload/pdf/kenya_report_full.pdf> accessed 10 October 2015.
4 Fernando Velayos, et al. “Regional Integration and Tax Harmonisation: Issues
and Recent Experiences” <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTPA/
Resources/Velayos-Villela-Barreix.pdf> accessed 21 September 2013. See also,
Kenneth Bagamuhunda, ‘Status and Road map of Tax Harmonisation in EAC’
<www.wbginvestmentclimate.org/advisory-services/regulatory-simplification/
business-taxation/upload/Status-and-Road-map-of-Tax-Harmonization-in-
EAC-Kenneth-Bagamuhunda.pdf> accessed 1 September 2013
5 Welfare or deadweight loss refers to the economic or efficiency cost imposed by
taxes or associated with taxation and is distinct from administrative and compliance
cost. It is a function of the decision altering (or inducing) impact of taxes on
economic actors. See James R. Hines, “Excess Burden of Taxation” (2007)
Michigan Ross School of Business WP 2007-1 <www.bus.umich.edu/otpr/
WP2007-1.pdf> accessed 1 July 2015.
1.  INTRODUCTION
Notwithstanding the fact that power to tax is coterminous with theboundary of the sovereign’s jurisdiction,1 taxation in a state may
affect economic life in other states, and may influence the economic indices
and the development trajectory of taxing state in diverse ways. For
example, a tax policy that is oriented towards incentives and exemptions
is a base for revenue loss2 and from the development perspective the lost
revenue is lost development opportunity.3 The existence of high corporate
tax rate in a country or state relative to others is a disincentive to foreign
capital movement; and may cause outflow of capital or its shift to
jurisdictions with less burdensome tax regime. The aforementioned is
also part of the rationale behind the competition to attract investment.
Tax harmonization is touted as an option for ameliorating the
consequences of the seeming extra-jurisdictional tax reach of a sovereign4
as well as issues like the welfare or deadweight loss associated with the
decision of economic actors within jurisdiction.5
274 AFE BABALOLA UNIVERSITY: J. OF SUST. DEV. LAW & POLICY VOL. 6: 1: 2015
6 Andrew Lymer and John Hasseldine (eds.), The International Taxation System
(Springer Science + Business Media, 2002) 117.
7 It is the basis for the adoption of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on
European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU) [2012] C 326, p. 0001-0390; the Council Directive (EC) 2006/112
of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax. See generally,
Official Journal of the European Union Notice/C 115/01 <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:TOC> accessed 3 July
2015. On the African continent, it is premise for article 32-34, Protocol on the
Establishment of the East African Community Common Market sequel to which
tax policies, law and administration is being pursued amongst members of the
East African Community. See generally, <www.eac.int/commonmarket/
index.php?option=com_docman&task= cat_view&gid=30&Itemid=6> accessed
3 July 2015. Tax harmonisation is considered a corollary of the signing of the
Southern African Development Community Protocol on Trade (1996) because,
sequel to it, member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC)
are obligated to amend their tax laws with a view to eliminating all barriers to
trade in or with them by other SADC members. See <www.sadc.int/files/4613/
5292/8370/ Protocol_on_Trade1996.pdf> accessed 3 July 2015.
8 See Velayos (n 5) 5ff.
Tax harmonization has assumed global prominence. The driver for
this is globalization, the emergence of open borders, factor mobility and
the pressure to compete with neighbours for investment, the re-insurgence
of economic and trade groupings, etc. What is tax harmonization? Tax
harmonization refers to the process, whether conscious or otherwise, of
making taxes identical or similar across regions. It is a tool used in dealing
with the corollaries associated with interaction of the different tax systems
of the world.6 The product of tax harmonization is the existence of
harmonized tax rates or administrative process amongst states, regions
or groupings. It is an orientation that has been adopted in different corners
of the globe7 and is of varied levels or degrees (to wit: standardization,
compatibility, coordination, cooperation and convergence).8
What does tax harmonization portend for developing countries or
how does it impact on their development? The answer to this question is
distillable from an understanding of the relationship between taxation,
development and institutions in the state. The trio influence, shape, and
colour one another. The socio-economic institutions of a state are major
determinants of its capacity to attract investments and development
potential.9 On its part, taxation can impact on economic and political
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9 See Ifeanyichukwu A. Aniyie, “Foreign Investment and the Development of the
Third World: An Examination of the Realities” (2012) Vol. 1, Journal of
Contemporary Law 155,159-165 where socio-economic factors (institutions
inclusive ) that influence inflow of investment into the third world were examined.
10 For example, in Ghana, widespread public protest led to the repeal of a 17 per
cent value added tax in 1995; its redesign eventual repeal of the legislation. See
Ghana Mining Laws and Regulations Handbook (Vol 1) (USA, 2015) 33.
11 The National Health Insurance Levy and the Communication Service Tax of
Ghana are examples of the use of tax proceeds for specific developmental purpose.
The former is used to fund health insurance schemes for Ghanaians; while the
latter is earmarked for the finance of the Ghanaian National Youth Employment
Programme. See generally, Nathan J Blanchet, et al, “The Effect of Ghana’s
National Health Insurance Scheme on Health Care Utilisation” (June 2012) Vol.
46 (2) Ghana Medical Journal 76-84 <www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC3426378/#R8> accessed 1 August 2014. See also Ghana Revenue Authority,
Tax Information: Value Added Tax <www.gra.gov.gh/index.php?option=com
content & view=article&id=44&Itemid=47> accessed 1 August 2014. See also,
Ifeanyichukwu A. Aniyie and Ohio Omiunu, ‘Optimising the Development
Options in the Third World Countries: Looking Beyond Foreign Aid’ (2014) 1
(2) Ife Journal of International and Comparative Law 240-259 where taxation
was recommended as complementary to foreign aid for moving third world
countries into the “take-off stage” of economic development and growth. Also
see Oyinlola Olaniyi, “Mismatch between Tax Yield and Revenue Requirement
for Financing Social Overhead Capital in Nigeria: Imperatives for an Alternative
Revenue Framework” in Josephine Agbonika (ed), Topical Issues on Nigerian
Tax Laws and Related Areas (Ababa Press Ltd 2015) 398, 405-406 where the
author drew a nexus between tax revenue yield, tax to GDP ratio and capacity to
fund socio-infrastructure development in Nigeria.
12 Internationally, public participation has been accepted as a criterion for sustainable
development. This is a product of the thinking introduced by Agenda 21. See
paragraph 23.2, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
Agenda 21 UN Doc. A/CONF. 151/26/Rev1, 31 ILM 874 (1992).
instability (or change)10 as well as development.11 Another manifestation
of the relationship is that taxation is the exercise of sovereign power by
the state. It provides a basis for consensual interaction and public
participation in the political structuring and governance of the state.12 It
also allows for a bottom-up approach to dealing with the developmental
issues of the State. Furthermore, taxation, as a means of state or public
financing, is in line with the principle of sustainable development (also
referred to as sustainability principle) as it ensures that the machinery for
sourcing of public finance is established and operates in a manner that at
least maintains (and sometimes enhances) the physical, social and
economic environment for the benefit of current and future generations.13
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13 See United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development, Our
Common Future (OUP, 1987), ch. 2 <www.un-documents.net/ocf-02.htm#I>
accessed 8 October 2015 .
14 Between August 2013 and March 2014, the author interviewed personnel of the
tax policy; legislation department and the legal department of FIRS on the
condition of anonymity.
15 Velayos (n 5) 8.
This article examines the option of tax harmonization as a means of
achieving economic integration of a developing country with other
economies, with focus on Nigeria. It highlights developments in the
Nigerian tax system that relate to tax harmonization, the benefits and
costs for Nigeria’s participation in tax harmonization. The article is
qualitative and expository in approach. It reports findings of direct
interviews with legal and tax policy personnel;14 reviews key literature
on the subject and provides a description of issues that can be termed the
“pros and cons” of the policy of tax harmonization and that are capable
of crystallizing in Nigeria upon adoption of this tax policy.
Structurally, the paper is divided into six parts. This introduction is
the first. Section 2 reviews Nigeria’s standing with regard to tax
harmonization. Sections 3 and 4, respectively, analyse the benefits and
costs associated with the adoption of tax harmonization. Section 5
highlights some challenges capable of impacting on the implementation
of a tax harmonization policy by Nigeria. The article concludes in section
6.
2.  TAX HARMONIZATION: WHERE IS NIGERIA?
Using the Velayos, et al.15 pyramid of degrees of tax harmonization as a
reference point, the table below summarizes the degree of tax
harmonization, the instruments of harmonization; i.e., the means adopted
in Nigeria for harmonization and the taxes affected by the harmonization.
2015 ACHIEVING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT THROUGH TAX HARMONIZATION 277
16 This is at the top of the pyramid and is the highest degree of harmonization. It is
characterized by the existence of similar taxes on similar tax handles or burdens
in different states. An example of standardization is the adoption of a common
external tariff (CET) by different states or within a region.
17 The legal mandate for the ECOWAS CET is article 3, ECOWAS Revised Treaty
and the ECOWAS Regulation C/REG.1/5/09. The cardinal goal of the CET is
the removal of all trade barriers within the ECOWAS region, establishment of a
common market and customs union for members as well as free movement of
goods and persons within the region.
18 Nigeria is a signatory but is yet to comply with its primary recommendation as
VAT is currently charged at 5 per cent in line with the provisions of section 4,
Value Added Tax Act, Cap V1 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 (as
amended) (hereafter referred to as VAT Act)
19 This involves the adjustment of the tax structure or rate of states in the course or
process of economic integration. At this level, the focus is to counteract or
compensate for the distortions caused by the tax burden disparities between the
states in the grouping.
20 DTAs can be bilateral or multilateral. For literature on the types of DTAs, the
advantages and disadvantages of the adoption of the types, see Victor Thuronyi,
Comparative Tax Law (Kluwer Law International 2003) 121; Kim Brooks, “The
Potential of Multilateral Tax Treaties” in Michael Lang, et al. (eds), Tax Treaties:
Building Bridges between Law and Economics (IBFD 2010) 211-236. For
information on Nigeria’s DTA standing, see Appendix 1, infra.
21 These are taxes on income of persons (corporate or individual) from employment,
business or property accruing in, derived from, brought into, or received in
Nigeria. Nigeria has a model DTA that is used as template for negotiation with
prospective treaty partners and it specifically recognises the taxes grouped in this
essay as income taxes except the National Information Technology Development
Levy.
22 This is charged pursuant to section 3, Personal Income Tax Act, Cap P8 Laws of
the Federation of Nigeria 2004 (as amended) (PITA).
23 This is charged pursuant to sections 9 and 13, Companies Income Tax Act, Cap
C21 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 (CITA).
24 The tax is levied pursuant to section 8, Petroleum Profits Tax Act, Cap P13 Laws






Standardization16 ECOWAS CET17 
ECOWAS VAT Protocol18 
Import duties/ tariffs  
Value Added Tax (VAT) 
Compatibility19 Double Tax Agreements 
(DTAs)20 
Income taxes,21 to wit: 
Personal Income Tax22 
Companies Income Tax23 










  Levy25 
Education Tax26 
Capital Gains Tax27 
Coordination28 Technical/Financial 
assistance or aid or grants 
All taxes 
Cooperation29 Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) 
Agreement on Exchange of 
Information on Tax 
Matters30 
Multilateral Convention on 
Mutual Administrative 
Assistance in Tax Matters31 
As a group, they apply to 
all forms of compulsory 
payments to government 
except customs duties 
Nigeria is yet to commit to 
any of the Instruments of 
harmonization that are 
peculiar to this level   
 
25 The basis of the levy is section 12, National Information Technology Development
Agency Act Cap N156, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 (as amended in
2007) (NITDAA). Though the Nigeria model DTA does not specifically mention
the levy, by virtue of its article 2 (3) (VI), the NITDAA and the levy is deemed
subject to a DTA fashioned after the Nigeria model DTA.
26 This is levied pursuant to the Tertiary Education Trust Fund Tax Act 2011
(TETFUND Act).
27 This is charged on the gain from the disposal of a qualified capital asset pursuant to
the Capital Gains Tax Act, Cap. C1 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 (CGTA).
28 This is an in-between category and is constituted of all and any endeavour that
does not fit into the other four categories. Technical assistance/aid, training etc.
pertaining to taxation provided by multilateral or donor agencies to states can be
categorized as coordination. For the purpose of this paper, procedural
arrangements aimed at information exchange are grouped as cooperation. This is
not without acknowledgment of the fact that some scholars have included them
in this group. See Thomas Hemmelgarn and Gaetan Nicodeme, “Tax Co-
ordination in Europe: Assessing the First years of the EU-Savings Taxation
Directive”, (2009) CESIFO Working Paper No. 2675 <www.cesifo-group.de/
portal/page/portal/9684335711730D9FE04400144FAFBA7C> accessed 21 June
2014.
29 This is characterized by mutual assistance actuated by either reciprocity or mutual
interest. Procedural arrangements aimed at exchange of information are grouped
as cooperation.
30 See <www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/2082215.pdf> accessed 19
August 2013.
31 Hereafter referred to as Multilateral Convention. It allows, among other things,
automatic exchange of information, simultaneous tax examinations and assistance
in the collection of tax debts. This was initially developed for application within
the jurisdiction of OECD and the Council of Europe members. Subscription
was later opened to all countries vide a Protocol which came into force on 1 June
2011. Nigeria, on 29 March 2013 signed the OECD Multilateral Convention.
See “Nigeria Signs OECD’s Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative
Assistance in Tax Matters” (2013) Gauge (A Quarterly Publication of the Federal
Inland Revenue Service) 27.






 Tax Information Exchange 
Agreements (TIEAs)32 
ATAF Agreement on 
Mutual Assistance in Tax 
Matters 
  
Convergence33 Income Tax (Transfer 
Pricing) Regulations 2012 
(ITR)34 
Tax Administration (Self 
Assessment) Regulations 
2011 (TASAR)35  
Federal Inland Revenue 
Service (Establishment) Act 
2007 (FIRSEA)36 
Adoption of International 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
All taxes 
 
32 The purpose of TIEAs is to promote international cooperation in tax matters
through exchange of information. They grew out of the work undertaken by the
OECD to address harmful tax practices.
33 This is a movement by states (sometimes unwanted) towards harmonization.
Convergence could be catalysed by globalization and/or competition. It is
characterized by the existence of discomfort, passivity or the orientation that a
state must go with the trend or that it cannot escape the trend.
34 The ITR gives effect to the provisions of section 17, PITA; section 22, CITA;
section 15, PPTA and inter alia has the objective of ensuring that Nigeria is able
to tax on an appropriate basis corresponding to the economic activities embarked
upon by taxable persons within Nigeria, including their transactions and dealings
with associated enterprises; reduce the risk of double taxation. See Regulations
1-3, ITR.
35 The TASAR sets out processes, procedures and provide standard guidelines for
the implementation in Nigeria of the self assessment regime of tax administration.
36 The FIRSEA established the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) and vests it
with the responsibility of administering the different taxes specified in its First
Schedule on behalf of the Federal Government of Nigeria.
3.  BENEFITS OF TAX HARMONIZATION
Tax harmonization is a desirable policy for promoting sustainable
development in emerging economies. For Nigeria, many benefits can be
identified, including the ones discussed below.
3.1 Uniformity and Certainty
Within regional/supranational entities or amongst states, tax
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37 See sections 1-3 and 8-9 VAT Act.
38 A business making taxable supplies of goods and services in excess of GHC 10,000
over a 12-month period or has annual turnover of GHC 90,000 or less is required
to register for VAT purposes. See Deloitte, ‘Ghana: Highlights 2012’ (2012)
<www.deloitte.com/assets/DcomGlobal/Local%20Assets/Documents/Tax/
Taxation%20and%20Investment%20Guides/2012/dttl_tax_highlight_
2012_Ghana.pdf> accessed 14 August 2013.
harmonization is a veritable tool for ensuring that there is uniformity
and certainty in the tax systems in the region. For example, within
ECOWAS, in the absence of harmonization, a corporate entity resident
in Nigeria and operating in other states within the region will be faced
with varied treatment and divergence arising from the peculiarity of the
various tax systems subsumed within ECOWAS. An example of the
foregoing is that relating to classification (and by extension, treatment).
A company classed (segmented and stratified) as a medium taxpayer in
Nigeria may not be so classed in Sierra Leone where it carries out similar
operations. This and the existence of different accounting/tax regime
would lead to the absence of uniformity, uncertainty, the existence of
varied obligations and burdens on the company.
This plays out with regards to VAT administration in Ghana and
Nigeria. It is compulsory for all resident and non-resident companies
doing business in Nigeria to register for VAT,37 while there is a registration
threshold in Ghana.38 The consequence of the foregoing is that an entity
below the registration threshold in Ghana but providing goods and
services in Nigeria, must register for VAT in Nigeria. However, this is
not the case where there is some degree of tax harmonization between
both jurisdictions. Attendant also in the circumstances is cost saving
associated with economies of scale. The uniformity induced by
harmonization comes with the added benefit of providing a tool for
combating forum shopping. Forum shopping exists when an economic
actor domiciles business interests in a jurisdiction region for the duration
of the existence of economic benefit(s) for so doing and upon effluxion
of the latter, relocates the business interest from the jurisdiction. It also
introduces cost certainty, which is desirable for business planning.
3.2 Reduction in Spatial Externalities
Whatever the degree of tax harmonization achieved, there is the benefit
of a reduction in spatial externalities. An example of this is the reduction
of the level of cross-border revenue shift or loss suffered by states. With
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39 For example see article 20 of the Agreement between the Government of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Government of the Peoples’ Republic of China
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the prevention of Fiscal Evasion with
Respect to Taxes on Income (Nigeria-China DTA) which provides the template
for the taxation of teachers and researchers.
40 See Joint Venture Operations <www.nnpcgroup.com/NNPCBusiness/
UpstreamVentures.aspx> accessed 2 September 2013.
41 Tax revenue from the oil industry was 63.46 per cent of the total tax revenue
from 2001-2011. See Appendix 2 infra for a summary of FIRS collection from
2001-2011.
42 This amounted to 62.9 per cent of the total revenue collected from 2008 to 2012.
See Appendix 3 infra for a summary of revenue collection from 2008 to 2011.
DTAs, Nigeria is able to reduce the quantum of loss suffered as a result
of factor mobility (capital and labour).39 This is also the case with the
adoption of the CET. It is bound to reduce cross-border arbitrage. If
(and when) Nigeria adopts the recommendation of the ECOWAS VAT
Protocol, the revenue accruing to neighbouring jurisdictions with higher
VAT rates when items purchased in Nigeria are sold will be no more and
the cross-border loss of revenue suffered by Nigeria as a result of the sale
of consumer goods bought in Nigeria (a low consumption tax jurisdiction)
in high tax jurisdictions would be checked.
3.3 Combat Tax Planning Manoeuvres
The existence of modern financial instruments, variance in tax systems,
accounting and tax rules/practices, provides transnational corporations
(TNCs) and resident taxpayers with opportunity for tax planning
manoeuvres. This should be an issue of importance to Nigeria, firstly, of
its dependence on oil revenue and the fact that TNCs own about 40 per
cent of the factors that are put to production in the oil industry.40 Secondly,
these factors are a contributor to the tax revenue from the oil industry
(Nigeria’s major source of revenue).41 Thirdly, on the average, they are
utilized in the production of about two-third of the total revenue collected
from the sector.42
With reference to international tax avoidance and evasion, a
convergence in accounting and tax rules/practices will be of immense
benefit to Nigeria. This is because it will aid in the removal of the variance
which make tax planning manoeuvres attractive to TNCs. Transfer
pricing, double dipping, thin capitalization, treaty shopping, patronage
of tax havens and inversion transactions can be combated with DTAs
modelled after the United Nations (UN) Model Double Taxation
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43 The UN Model is recommended because it gives more recognition to the source
country principle of taxation of active income than what is provided for under
the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital (OECD Model). This
benefit is of importance and desirable where the orientation is the attraction and
retention of foreign investment within the borders of Nigeria. For an analysis of
the UN and OECD Models, see Michael Lennard, “The UN Model Tax
Convention as compared with the OECD Model Tax Convention – Current
Points of Difference and Recent Developments” (Jan/Feb 2009) Asia-Pacific Tax
Bulletin, 4 <www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Lennard_0902_UN_Vs_
OECD.pdf>\accessed 7 July 2013. See also UN, United Nations Model Double
Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries (NY: 2011)
<www.un.org/esa/ffd/documents/UN_Model_2011_Update.pdf> accessed 7 July
2013. Cf. article 5 of the UN and OECD Models.
44 This is preferred as it provides a means of combating the challenge of searching
for and identifying comparable options posed by the utilization of the SA/transfer
pricing rules. For arguments in favour of the utilization of formulary
apportionment, see Jit Han Dennis Tan, “Unitary Formulary Apportionment as
a Solution to the Conundrum of Source” <www.jmls.edu/academics/taxeb/pdf/
Faherty_1.pdf> accessed 17 July 2013; Tax Justice Network, “Transfer Pricing
in Developing Countries: An Introduction” <www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/
pdf/TP_in_developing_countries.pdf> accessed 2 July 2013; Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah, et. al, “Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt
a Formulary Profit Split” (2009), Vol. 9 (5) Florida Tax Review 497 <http://
repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1773&context=articles>
accessed 9 October 2015; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah and IIan Benshalom, “Formulary
Apportionment: Myths and Prospects - Promoting Better International Tax Policy
and Utilizing the Misunderstood and Under-Theorized Formulary Alternative”
(2011) 3 (No.3) World Tax Journal 371-398 <http://repository.law.umich.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2180&context=articles> accessed 9 October 2015.
Convention between Developed and Developing Countries (UN
Model),43 subscription to the Multilateral Convention on Administrative
Assistance in Tax Matters, TIEAs and the implementation of a system of
profit consolidation combined with formulary apportionment as
alternatives to the separate accounting (SA) rules which currently govern
the taxation of TNCs.44
3.4 Combating Competition
It stands to reason that in a globalized and economically integrated world,
states would compete for tax bases and inadvertently provide TNCs with
incentive to engage in manoeuvres that are capable of jeopardizing tax
systems. An option often implemented for this purpose is the reduction
of tax rates. Juxtaposed against the need for social spending and rectifying
economic distortions, the downside of this option is that tax contribution
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45 For an estimate of the US compliance cost, see Arthur Laffer et al, “The Economic
Burden Caused by Tax Code Complexity” (2011) <www.laffercenter.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/06/2011-Laffer-TaxCodeComplexity.pdf> accessed 3 July
2015. For statistic of cost of compliance in relation to GDP for Costa Rica and
Uruguay, see UN, ‘Measuring Tax Transaction Costs in Small and Medium
Enterprises’ (UN 2014) 101 and 189 <www.un.org/esa/ffd/documents/
TTC_Eng.pdf> accessed 6 November 2015.
to total national revenue will be at inefficiently low levels. The situation
is worsened by the fact these states often do not have policies and/or
strategies to counter the effect(s) of tax rate reduction on the economy
whose range includes a steady drop in government revenue to reduced
expenditure outlay for social welfare and services, etc.
Tax harmonization is an option for dealing with the propensity to
compete for tax bases among states. The reasoning behind this assertion
is premised on a stylized version of the rational taxpayer model, which
posits that where taxes are not harmonized, other things being equal,
economic actors will migrate to jurisdictions where there is the possibility
of paying less tax. In the face of this, states will be drawn into a competition
to provide the lowest tax rates. Therefore, with uniformity there is bound
to be a reduction in the use of tax rates as incentive in the competition for
foreign factors and its importance in the decision-making process of
taxpayers.
3.5 Improves Efficiency of the Tax System
The efficiency of a tax system is both economic and administrative. The
attainment of the former is a function of whether the taxes therein leads
to welfare loss above and beyond the tax revenues collected, or creates a
substitutionary effect (i.e., causes economic actors to substitute taxed
goods/services with untaxed or less taxed variants) or actuates economic
actors into making decisions or taking actions geared towards tax burden
minimizing. If the foregoing is the case, the tax system is inefficient. Thus,
the avoidance and evasion strategies employed by economic actors as
well as the cost of compliance are products of the efficiency or otherwise
of the tax system. Compliance cost is used here to refer to the cost incurred
by both the taxpayer and relevant tax authority (RTA) in the course of
complying with the dictates of the tax system.45 On the part of taxpayer,
it includes the time and money spent in record keeping, computation,
reporting, planning, etc. On the part of RTAs, it includes the time and
money spent in assessment, audit, investigation and litigation relating to
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46 Nigeria currently ranks the lowest with reference to the time (hours per year)
spent in the payment of tax in the ECOWAS region. See World Bank, Doing
Business 2016: Measuring Regulatory Quality and Efficiency (13th ed,
Washington, DC 2015), 65-68 <http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/~/media/
GIAWB/Doing%20Business/Documents/Profiles/Regional/DB2016/DB16-
Economic-Community-West-African-States.pdf> accessed 6 November 2015.
47 It should be noted that the choice of those discussed hereunder was made pursuant
to the response to interviews and discussion with tax policy officers in FIRS
from between August-October 2013.
48 See Articles 26 and 27 of the Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, 8 ILM
679, 690 (1969).
49 1988 ICJ 12 (Advisory Opinion of Apr. 26), reprinted in 27 ILM 808 (May 1988).
tax administration, etc.
In the realm of tax policy formulation, information pertaining to the
efficiency of the tax system is necessary for international comparisons.
For Nigeria, tax harmonization with trading partners or countries of the
first world would improve the Nigerian tax system. This because the
harmonization would provide Nigeria with a model to copy or adapt
and benchmark against which its tax system can be appraised. The
consequences of this includes reduction of welfare loss arising from the
avoidance and evasion strategies employed by economic actors as well as
the cost of tax administration and improved efficiency. The improved
efficiency of the system is a positive indicator that is bound to favourably
impact on Nigeria’s business climate,46 economic growth and
development.
4.  COST OF TAX HARMONIZATION
Tax harmonization is not without downsides. These constitute costs for
Nigeria and they include:47
4.1 Loss of Sovereignty
If Nigeria’s efforts (and those of the supranational groupings it belongs
to) are to be successful, of necessity, there has to be some ceding of fiscal
sovereignty and jurisdiction over issues pertaining to the forums’ fiscal
architecture to the supranational entity. This is usually the case, as the
document evidencing subscription to the grouping’s objectives is deemed
superior to the municipal legislation of the contracting parties.48 The
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its advisory opinion in the United
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50 See Vito Tanzi, “Is there a Need for a World Tax Organisation?” in Assaf Ranzin
and Effraim Sadka (eds), The Economics of Globalisation. Policy Perspectives from
Public Economics, (CUP 1999) 173-186. David Spencer “Centrifugal vs.
Centripetal Forces (Part 1)” (2010) Vol. 21(4) International Taxation, 38. See
also, Vito Tanzi, “Building Fiscal Capacity through Greater Cooperation” <www.
imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/03/tanzi.htm> accessed 23 August 2013.
51 Spencer (n 51) 42; Daniel Mitchell and Brian Garst, “The Unfortunate Genesis
of an International Organisation” (2011) <http://freedomandprosperity.org/files/
OECD/OffshoreInv-OECD.pdf> accessed 23 December 2013. See Reuven S.
Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Laws: An Analysis of the
International Tax Regime (CUP 2007) 78 and 183, where the author seems to
suggest this when he stated that a coordinated withholding tax imposed and
administered by OECD members is a better solution compared to a treaty network
to combat tax competition for passive investment. For a sample of opinion of
other writers on this subject, see also Allison Christians, “Sovereignty, Taxation
and Social Contract” (2008), Vol. 18 Minnesota Journal of International Law
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1259975> accessed 24 August 2013.
Nations Headquarters Agreement case has reaffirmed this position.49 This
issue is important because of the relationship between a state’s fiscal
architecture, its international trade capability and its right to determine
its tax policy. These are part of the constituents of the sovereign right of
any state. With reference to the aforementioned relationship, it is a fact
that tariffs on local products and industries will impact on their ability to
compete against imports. And when imports with relatively lower
production cost emanates from protectionist jurisdictions, the competition
ends in favour of the imports.
Also, with the standardization achieved via implementation of the
ECOWAS CET, Nigeria would effectively cede the sovereignty of
determining its import rates to other ECOWAS member states. This
would be the case, if Nigeria implements the recommendation of the
ECOWAS VAT Protocol which is to the effect that VAT within the region
is to be charged at a rate that is between 10 and 20 per cent. However,
with DTAs, there is less ceding, as Nigeria still has the opportunity of
determining the extent to which it accepts or adopts international
consensus on income taxation and the degree of bilateral tax
harmonization.
A prevalent opinion in literature on the subject of sovereignty within
the broad framework of tax harmonization is that there is need for a
supranational tax entity whose focus is global.50 This thought is perceived
to be a fall out of the activities and posturing of the OECD.51 According
to proponents, the international tax organization should have the capacity
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52 Tanzi (n 51). See also Jennifer E Farrell, The Interface of International Trade
Law and Taxation: Defining the Role of the WTO (IBFD 2013) 236ff.
53 For a plethora of literature which supports this position, see Christians (n 52), 6
(footnote 9).
54 This assertion finds support in international law; whether customary principles
like pact sunt servanda or hard law like the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. See Thuronyi (n 21), 118. Also, article 27 of the UN and OECD Models
imposes this duty on treaty partners in relation to each other.
55 This rule and/or practise is subsumed in article 27, UN and OECD Models.
56 See Attorney General v. Lutwydge (1729) 145 Eng. Rep. 674 (Ex. Div.); the
decision in Holman v. Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp. 341(per Lord Mansfield).
57 Brenda Mallinak, ‘The Revenue Rule: A Common Law Doctrine for the Twenty-
First Century’ (2006) Vol 16 Duke Journal of Contemporary and International
Law, 79-124. In the light of today’s reality, the rule is considered of high nuisance
value as it can aid in international tax planning, tax evasion and is capable of
negatively affecting the tax moral and burden in the state seeking to have its
revenue law enforced in the foreign forum. See Mallinak (above), 115-124 for
arguments for and against abandoning the revenue rule.
to provide high-level tax advice to countries that request and need it as
well as provide guidance to and surveillance of tax policy developments
and actions that have cross-country implications.52
The issue with this proposal is that it is contrary to the canons of the
sovereignty of states to which is attached the right of the state to use tax
independently or in conjunction with other fiscal means to generate
revenue for its use and the provision of public goods.53 Furthermore,
subscription to international tax treaties, both bilateral and multilateral,
generally obligates signatories to act as proxy tax administrators for treaty
partner(s) within their jurisdiction.54 Stretching this assertion further, it
means that states are obligated to use all their instruments and agencies
to aid their treaty partner(s) in the enforcement of the latter’s taxes within
their territory. Associated with this obligation is an intrinsic cost to be
borne by treaty partners notwithstanding the rule that the financial cost
of revenue claims is charged to the debtor or the requesting states where
the cost cannot be recovered from the debtor.55 This intrinsic cost stems
from the reallocation of the resources of the requested state from their
primary assignment of tax administration to the provision of assistance
to the requesting state pursuant to its treaty obligation. Furthermore,
this development is contrary to the revenue rule56 which in its modern
form allows courts to decline entertaining suits or enforcing foreign tax
judgments or foreign revenue laws.57
 Related to the issue of sovereignty is the obligation imposed on treaty
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58 For DTAs, such provisions are adapted from article 26 of the UN and OECD
Models. Another example is article 5, ATAF Agreement on Mutual Assistance in
Tax Matters.
59 Tax base erosion and revenue shifting should not be perceived in the same light
as base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS). The former relates to a contraction of
the tax base and/or a reduction in the applicable tax rate as a result of the state’s
subscription to bilateral/multilateral instruments like DTAs which
consequentially leads to movement of revenue outside the border of the
subscribing state. This is different from BEPS which amounts to the extraction
of pre-tax profits from high tax jurisdictions to low tax jurisdictions with the use
of tax deductible expenses (e.g. interest, management fees, royalties, etc.) or
acceptable transfer pricing or acceptable business structuring within a
multinational group.
60 For an overview and comparative analysis of the old and new rate, see KPMG,
“Implementation of the ECOWAS Common External Tariff and Destination
Inspection Scheme in Nigeria” (July 2006) <www.kpmg.com/NG/en/
IssuesAndInsights/Artic lesPublicat ions/Documents/Newsletter%
20on%20ECOWAS%20Common%20External%20Tariff-July%202006.pdf>
accessed 24 July 2013.
partners to facilitate effective exchange of information and assistance
between them by various instruments of harmonization.58 By virtue of
these provisions, treaty partners allow into their jurisdiction, the presence
of officials of their partner(s) who so request(s), to interview individuals
and examine taxpayer records, whether or not there is mutuality of
interest.
4.2 Tax Base Erosion and Revenue Shifting59
Harmonization has the capacity to bring about tax base erosion and profit
shifting. For example, subscription to the ECOWAS CET system brings
about loss of fiscal space for its subscribers. With regard to Nigeria,
pursuant to the ECOWAS CET regime, industrial machinery and
equipment, electricity generating sets which used to attract import duty
of 15 per cent is now duty free, while finished goods mineral water,
chocolate which used to attract import duty of 150 per cent and 100 per
cent, respectively, now attract 20 per cent import duty.60 Consequentially,
the tariff bands under the ECOWAS CET would lead to tariff contraction,
tax base erosion and revenue shift.
DTAs also have similar consequences as they effectively shift tax
revenue from investment income (passive income) in source state to
resident state. In a tax treaty relationship between Nigeria and a developed
country, Nigeria would be disadvantaged as some (if not all) income from
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61 See Articles 7, 10, 11, 12 and 21 of the UN and OECD Models. See similar
provisions in articles 7, 10, 11, 12 and 22 of Nigeria-China DTA.
62 See section 5(4)-(6) of Nigeria-China DTA for similar provisions.
63 Brian J. Arnold and Michael J. McIntyre, International Tax Primer (2nd ed,
Wolters Kluwer 2002) 166.
any investment inflow from the developed country would move in the
opposite direction. This is because DTAs characteristically allocate taxing
rights61 and provide relief in situations of double taxation. Furthermore,
the provisions of articles 5 (4)-(6) of both the UN and OECD Models
create opportunity for tax base erosion and revenue shifting.62 This is
because it also creates exceptions to the permanent establishment (PE)
rule used to determine when an enterprise has sufficient connection with
a country to subject it to tax on its income attributable to the PE.63 In the
circumstances, to avoid the burden of tax associated with a PE – and
effectively erode the tax base and shift revenue from the source country
– most TNCs create dependent agents with absolutely no right to conclude
contracts involving their core business or having any economic impact
on the core business of the TNC.
4.3 Distortion of Neutrality of Tax System
A tax system is neutral where taxpayers’ allocative decisions are a product
of market forces and not the taxes therein. A neutral tax is deemed efficient
because it does not give rise to welfare loss or economic burden. In the
realm of international taxation, neutrality is subsumed in the theory of
capital export neutrality (CEN) and capital import neutrality (CIN). CEN
and CIN have as their core the elimination of variance in tax systems so
as to deny taxpayers the ability of reducing their tax burden by shifting
their economic activities to states with more favourable tax systems. CEN
is thus achieved when the outflow of capital from a state are not actuated
by tax consideration, while CIN involves subjecting investment to similar
treatment regardless of their origin.
Tax harmonization in its current form is erasing variance in the tax
system of states and unwittingly creating them across regions as well as
creating supranational tax jurisdictions in the course of standardization
of tax systems. In the light of this, tax neutrality is distorted as economic
actors are given the capacity to arrange their affairs in any way that best
makes use of the variances which standardization introduces. For example,
the DTA between Nigeria and China achieves CEN between them. But
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its existence could lead to treaty shopping by economic actors not
connected to the treaty partners if it provides them with an advantage.
Therefore, the instrument of tax harmonization becomes a tool with which
the neutrality of the Nigerian tax system and the behaviour of economic
actors in relation to it are distorted.
4.4 Abuse
This is possible where there is a cross-border transaction within the
jurisdiction of parties to a DTA. In such situation, it arises: (a) where a
DTA is improperly used as a basis for tax avoidance, and/or (b) where
the existence of DTA prevents the effective operation of municipal anti-
avoidance rules. The existence of a DTA between states ordinarily creates
advantages for residents (and sometimes national/citizens) of contracting
states. This advantage is often exploited (or abused) by TNCs that lack
the requisite status and for who the treaty benefit was not intended as a
means of tax avoidance. The prominent means of achieving this is usually
with the use of a conduit entity resident in one of the contracting state.
A second form of abuse manifests where a taxpayer deliberately
arranges its affairs in a manner that allows it benefit from the existence of
a treaty provision which countervails municipal anti-avoidance provisions.
This scenario is possible because, as has been stated (and it is trite), the
provisions of treaties supersede the provisions of municipal legislation.
4.5 Equity Concerns
Tax harmonization brings about standardization, elimination of variances
and differences in tax systems. This is oftentimes achieved without the
setting up of structures and processes geared towards addressing the equity
issues which the harmonization births in tax systems. This development
has the capacity of jeopardizing inter-state tax equity. For example, in a
situation where Nigeria pursues tax harmonization (via a DTA for
example) with a developed country, there are bound to be equity issues
as the taxpayers in the both states would receive equivalent treatment
instead of the different treatment which their individual circumstances
and peculiarities would ordinarily necessitate.
The intra-state equity is also not spared. The social contract, which is
the basis of the existence of the state, loses it prominence where Nigeria
enters into harmonizing arrangements and agreements without
considering the interest of its citizens. The subscription to the ECOWAS
CET without prior consideration of the impact on the economy is an
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64 See KPMG (n 61). See also “The ECOWAS Common External Tariff (CET) and
Regional Integration” (December 2012) Vol. 2 (2)  ECOWAS Vanguard 1-8.
65 Cap L5 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria.
66 Cap T5 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria.
67 For an exposé on both principles, see Liam Ebril, et al, The Modern VAT, (IMF
2001), 176; Rebecca Millar, ‘The Jurisdictional Reach of VAT’ in Richard Krever
(ed), VAT in Africa (PULP 2008) 175-214.
68 Alan Schenk and Oliver Oldman, Value Added Tax: A Comparative Approach:
A Comparative Approach (CUP 2007) 188.
example of this situation. The primary effect of this is loss of revenue to
Nigeria as a result of reduction of rates to 35 per cent from a high of 150
per cent, insufficient protection of domestic enterprise and the 100 per
cent increase of the duty on raw materials from 2.5 per cent to 5 per
cent.64
5.  PRACTICAL CHALLENGES TO
TAX HARMONIZATION
There exist issues which are relevant as they impact on the attainment of
the objective(s) behind the adoption of this policy. Though not all come
within the ambit of tax policy, they bring about challenges, which Nigeria
has experienced (and would experience) in the course of harmonization
of its tax system with that of other economies. Amongst them is the issue
of definition. A practical example is the definition of the land mass referred
to as Nigeria. Nigeria is as defined by sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) (CFRN). Pursuant
to the provisions of sections 44(3), 315(5), Part 1 of the First Schedule of
the CFRN, Section 1 of the Land Use Act65 and section 1(1) of the
Territorial Waters Act,66 it extends from the seabed and subsoil beginning
from the low water mark from which the territorial waters of Nigeria are
measured continuing seawards to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles.
Any definition outside the foregoing is unconstitutional.
Another relates to the application of the destination principle in VAT
administration in Nigeria. The destination and origin principles guide
the application of VAT. The former has the effect of vesting capacity to
charge VAT on the country where consumption takes place, while the
latter vests capacity on the country where the transaction originates.67
Pursuant to the First Schedule of the VAT Act, Nigeria operates
destination value added tax system (as all exported goods and services
are VAT exempt) and has what is referred to as a territorial reach VAT.68
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69 Unregistered entity is used here to refer to an entity that is not obligated pursuant
to section 8 of the VAT Act to register for VAT purposes.
The associated challenges arise when goods are supplied to a Nigerian
entity located outside the territory of Nigeria or the supply relates to a
business-to-consumer transaction involving a service that is not easily
identifiable (e.g., electronic service) to a unregistered entity.69 In relation
to the former, by operation of law the entity’s consumption becomes
VAT exempt by virtue of its location. The latter throws up challenges,
which tax policy formulation, would have to contend with.
The issue of variance or mismatch of the taxpayers’ ability to pay is
also a challenge to the success of any harmonization policy. Where Nigeria
pursues income tax harmonization with a state possessing taxpayers with
higher ability to pay, the harmonization would catalyse a substitution
effect. The taxpayers in reaction would work less. It also has the propensity
of leading to labour mobility or migration to more favourable tax climes
(and possible brain drain), etc.
6.  CONCLUSION
The arguments above, though stylized, indicate that the option of tax
harmonization as a route to attaining the integration of Nigeria with other
economies has its costs and benefits. What has not been stated is how the
adoption and implementation of this policy would impact on the
development of Nigeria. Tax harmonization has the potential of ensuring
equitable and fair taxation as well as the provision of sustainable revenue
for the financing of public expenditure. Therefore, the relationship is that
tax harmonization would provide sustainable revenue that can be put to
use for the sustainable development of the state. The revenue is sustainable
because it is derived per time from current tax bases without depriving
future generations the capacity of contributing to the development of
their milieu through their tax bases or contribution.
Albeit the foregoing, there are a few extra considerations that should
pre-occupy tax policy formulators. It is of importance that the purpose
of the harmonization should be predetermined before the commencement
of the process. For example, it should be clear whether it is for the purpose
of creating linkages to facilitate economic relationships; or for the purpose
of signalling to the world that the state is a global player or courting
accolades; or whether the purpose is for increasing revenue inflow. It is
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70 Kehinde Ajayi and Philip Osafo-Kwaako, “Research and Trade Policy
Formulation: The Case of Nigeria’s Adoption of the ECOWAS Common
External Tariff” (July 2007) Working Paper No. 78, 9 <www.inter-reseaux.org/
IMG/pdf_The_case_of_Nigeria_s_adoption_of_the_ECOWAS_CET.pdf>
accessed 28 September 2013.
sequel to a decision on the foregoing that further decisions on the issue
of the direction of the harmonization, who to harmonize with and the
degree of the harmonization can then be taken. This would assist policy
makers in balancing the down side (cost) of harmonization against the
objective(s) to be achieved.
Tax policy is not insular and unconnected to other policies of the
state. It is influenced by the foreign policy and development plan of the
state. This means that for the benefits of harmonization to be fully realized,
research and empirical information which would provide: (a) an
understanding of the contemporary context; and (b) guide the formulation
(and update) of a development plan of the state is needed. This would
facilitate the understanding of the socio-economic cum political as well
as situational dynamics of the state per time and a compass for determining
the path to tread with regards to harmonization. Interviewees at FIRS
surmised that decisions with regards to the direction/level of
harmonization to pursue in Nigeria was reached without research and
empirical information. To further substantiate the foregoing, one
interviewee stated that if either were made use of, Nigeria ought to have
negotiated and entered into DTAs with more African states or ECOWAS
in view of the fact that more Nigerian business trade in these regions
compared to the few who trade with the generality of its current DTA
partners.
Closely related to the foregoing is the need to avoid politically
motivated harmonization. It has been stated that Nigeria’s adoption of
the ECOWAS CET was driven by the politics of regional integration.70
The subsequent request for inclusion of the fifth band is support for the
foregoing assertion. Consequently, if tax harmonization is to be worth
anything to Nigeria, the degree and direction of harmonization should
be based on the priority of its importance to the tax system, not on political
convenience. Therefore, the decision as per the foregoing should be that
which would avoid harmonization with no economic and developmental
benefit for Nigeria.
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71 See section 34, Personal Income Tax (Amendment) Act 2011 which amends the
Sixth Schedule of the PITA (the principal Act).
72 See section 40(6), CITA.
73 Pursuant to the provisions of section 12 CFRN, implementation of treaties/
conventions in Nigeria is by transformation. That is, before any obligation arising
from therefrom becomes binding and enforceable in Nigeria, the latter must
specifically be enacted by the National Assembly as municipal legislation. See
Abacha v Fawehinmi (2001) 4 SCNJ 400; cf Medical Health Workers Union of
Nigeria v Minister of Labour and Productivity [2004)] NWLR (Pt. 953) 1, 23-24
where the Court of Appeal, relying on the decision in Abacha v Fawehinmi (supra)
held that t signed International Labour Organisation Convention was inapplicable
in Nigeria because it had not been enacted into law by the National Assembly.
This requirement creates extra cost that becomes associated with the tax system
of the state. In the case of Nigeria, the cost stems from the time and human effort
that would go into the enactment of the DTA into law by the National Assembly.
As highlighted before now, tax harmonization opens up the state to
interference, tax base erosion and revenue shifting. In the light of these,
there is the need for counter strategies where harmonization is favoured.
To this end, tax administrators and policy formulators must mobilize
fresh resources and imaginative solutions. With reference to Nigeria’s
tax base, not only should it be protected, policies that can expand it should
be put in place. Thus, the following are proposed. The top marginal rate
of personal income tax, which is currently 24 per cent71 should be reduced
to put it at par with the lower marginal rate of company income tax which
is currently 20 per cent for small companies.72 This would make tax
arbitrage, base erosion, revenue shifting and other avoidance schemes
less attractive to individuals as well as ensure that revenue needed to
finance development is retained within the jurisdiction.
It is further suggested that TIEAs and Multilateral Conventions
should be negotiated and signed where the purpose of harmonization is
exchange of information for tax purposes. This is preferred as: (a) they
are less intrusive; (b) they do not limit the fiscal space of contracting
parties; (c) they do not impose other treaty obligations in the manner of
DTAs; and with specific reference to Nigeria, they are cheaper in terms
of the cost associated with their coming into being or its assent to the
DTAs or their implementation within Nigeria.73
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Appendix 1: Summary of Nigeria’s DTA standing


























5 France Comprehensive 27 February 
1990  
2 May 1991 1 January 
1992 




1977 1 January 
1978 
















10 Philippines Comprehensive 30 September 
1997 
Not yet in 
force 
- -  
11 Poland Comprehensive 12 February 
1999 
Not yet in 
force 
- - 
12 Republic of 
Korea 
Comprehensive 6 November 
2006  
Not yet in 
force 
- - 
13 Romania  Comprehensive 21 July 1992 18 April 1993 1 January 
1994 










16 Spain Comprehensive 23 June 2009 Not yet in 
force 
- - 
17 Sweden Comprehensive 18 November 
2004 










74 This treaty and that with Philippines, Poland, Republic of Korea, Spain and
Sweden do not have effective dates because they are yet to enter into force. A tax
treaty usually enters into force 30 days after the final/last notification between
treaty partners that constitutional or legal procedures required to make the treaty
enforceable in each contracting state have been completed.  The effective date is
usually the first date of the next assessment year. In the case of aforementioned
treaties, the final notification is yet to be received.
75 The Exchange of Tax Information Portal is an initiative of the OECD Global
Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes. For
more information, visit <http://eoi-tax.org/> accessed 25 October, 2013.
76 For more information, visit <www.firs.gov.ng/Tax-Management/Pages/Tax-
Treaties.aspx> accessed 12 October, 2013.
Source: Exchange of Information Portal (2013) and FIRS, Tax Treaties (2013)
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